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 Chapter 17 
Maggots and morals: Physical disgust 
is to fear as moral disgust is to anger
 Spike W. S. Lee and  Phoebe C. Ellsworth 1 
 Disgust is a puzzling emotion. In some ways it seems to be more primitive and biological than most 
other emotions, but it is also extremely variable across cultures. On the biological side, there is a 
universal facial expression of disgust ( Darwin,  1872 ;  Tomkins & McCarter,  1964 ) and it is one of 
the few expressions already present in newborns (in response to bitter tastes). It is elicited by putrid 
food, fetid smells, unclean bodily products such as vomit and feces, death and disfi guring disease, 
and other threats of contamination (e.g.,  Bloom,  2004 ,  Chapter  6 ;  Curtis & Biran,  2001 ;  Olatunji 
et al.,  2007 ;  Royzman & Sabini,  2001 ;  Rozin et al.,  1999 ,  2000 ;  Tybur et al.,  2009 ), and these elicitors 
are very general cross-culturally, perhaps universal. Disgusting things are warm, wet, soft , sticky, 
slimy, and bestial ( Angyal,  1941 ;  Miller,  1997 ).
 On the other hand, every culture also fi nds certain practices  morally disgusting, and there is 
enormous cultural, historical, and individual variability in these elicitors: young children sleeping 
in the same bed as their parents vs sleeping alone in a separate room ( Shweder et al.,  1995 ); blowing 
one’s nose in public vs spitting in public; women wearing shorts vs punishing women who wear 
shorts; interracial epithets vs interracial marriage. Practices that are seen as disgusting in some 
times or places are unnoticed or even approved in others.
 Is there a single emotion underlying responses to physically disgusting phenomena and the 
dizzying range of morally disgusting phenomena? What is the relation between the universal re-
sponse to feces and the highly variable response to women’s clothing? 
 17.1  Two kinds of disgust?
 Th eorists disagree about whether the term  disgust defi nes a single emotion, or more than one. 
Many researchers treat disgust as a homogeneous emotion with a set of prototypical experiential, 
expressive, physiological, and functional features. Particular examples of disgust may deviate from 
the prototype, but are seen as variations on the same basic theme. Th is assumption is oft en implicit, 
for example, in recent studies of the eff ects of physically disgusting stimuli on moral judgment and 
behavior (e.g.,  Jones & Fitness,  2008 ;  Schnall et al.,  2008 ;  Wheatley & Haidt,  2005 ) and on the cor-
responding eff ects of moral behavior on disgust-related choices ( Lee & Schwarz,  2009 ;  Zhong & 
Liljenquist,  2006 ).
 1 Contact authors: Phoebe C. Ellsworth (pce@umich.edu), Department of Psychology, University of 
Michigan, East Hall, 530 Church Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109–1043, USA or Spike W. S. Lee (spike.lee@
utoronto.ca), Department of Marketing, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 105 St. 
George Street, Toronto, ON M5S 3E6, Canada 
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 According to some researchers, only physical disgust is a true emotion, and the use of the word 
“disgusting” to refer to moral violations is nothing but a metaphorical extension of the term as a 
means of expressing extreme disapproval or indignation (e.g.,  Jones,  2007 ;  Nabi,  2002 ).  Royzman 
and Sabini ( 2001 ) argue that “purely” sociomoral cues cannot evoke disgust and that people simply 
use the term  disgust metaphorically to underscore the strength of their disapproval or indignation. 
Th ey note that the original version of the Disgust Sensitivity (DS) scale included items with socio-
moral elicitors of disgust, but these items were later removed due to a lack of correlation with the 
overall DS score ( cf. Haidt et al.,  1994 ). In a similar vein,  Moll et al. ( 2005 ) explicitly pointed out the 
moral connotation of disgust, which they thought should be properly labeled as  indignation and 
considered as a moral emotion  affi  liated with disgust (rather than being part of disgust). By impli-
cation,  disgust was reserved for its physical sense. Using written statements as stimuli, they found 
that self-reported physical disgust could be evoked with or without indignation. But interestingly, 
disgust and indignation activated both distinct  and overlapping brain areas.
 Other scientists propose the two broad clusters of “primary disgust,” “core disgust,” or “pure dis-
gust” on the one hand, and “complex disgust” or “(socio)moral disgust” on the other (e.g.,  Curtis & 
Biran,  2001 ;  Izard,  1977 ;  Haidt et al.,  1997 ;  Marzillier & Davey,  2004 ;  Miller,  1997 ;  Moll et al.,  2005 ; 
 Rozin et al.,  2000 ;  Tomkins,  1963 ). Th ese two clusters correspond to what we would like to call 
 physical disgust and  moral disgust . Th ey conceptualize complex, moral disgust as a more general 
extension or elaboration of basic, physical disgust through cultural development.  Curtis and Biran 
( 2001 ) speculated that disgust as “an aversion to physical parasites . . . may have come to serve an 
extended purpose, that of an aversion to social parasites,” whose overly selfi sh behaviors harm 
societal health, much as germs harm personal health. In physical disgust, we kill germs and avoid 
contamination; in moral disgust, we punish, avoid, and ostracize social parasites. Off ering some 
empirical support for this idea,  Chapman et al. ( 2009 ) found that physical contamination and im-
moral acts elicited the same facial response of oral-nasal rejection.
 By far the most common methodological approach to examining the two kinds of disgust has 
been to compare diff erent elicitors. In a review of the empirical literature on elicitors of disgust, 
 Rozin et al. ( 2000 ) identifi ed what they called core disgust, animal-reminder disgust, interpersonal 
disgust, and moral disgust ( see also Barker & Davey,  1997 ;  Haidt et al.,  1994 ;  Marzillier & Davey, 
 2004 ).  Borg et al. ( 2008 ) elicited disgust with pathogen-related acts, incestuous acts, and nonsex-
ual acts. Th ey found that participants’ self-reported disgust reactions were considerably stronger 
to pathogen-related and incestuous acts than to nonsexual acts. Th e three categories of elicitors 
entrained both common and unique brain networks, revealing discriminant validity at both phe-
nomenological and neurological levels. Th is distinction holds up in patients with Huntington’s 
disease, who show impairments in generating examples of situations that elicit physical disgust but 
have no trouble generating examples that elicit moral disgust ( Hayes et al.,  2007 ).
 Th is careful attention to diff erences in  elicitors does not extend to research on diff erences in the 
 experience or  consequences of physical and moral disgust. Many researchers seem to assume that 
the two kinds of disgust, once elicited, are qualitatively the same and involve the same components 
and processes. Challenging this assumption,  Marzillier and Davey ( 2004 ) showed that physical 
disgust and moral disgust were not only elicited by diff erent clusters of stimuli, but also showed 
diff erent emotional profi les. Moral disgust recruited other negative emotions such as sadness, con-
tempt, fear, and anger, but physical disgust showed no evidence of heightened ratings for any of 
these negative emotions.  Simpson et al. ( 2006 ) also found that physical and moral disgust were as-
sociated with diff erent self-reported emotional responses, and showed diff erent time courses and 
gender eff ects. Taken together, these prior fi ndings suggest that physical disgust and moral disgust 
are two rather diff erent emotional experiences.
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 Th e goal of our research is to add to this analysis an exploration of the  other component s of 
physical and moral disgust: the appraisals, the action tendencies, and the subjective experience. 
We begin with the assumption that diff erent kinds of elicitors almost certainly involve diff erent 
appraisals. We argue that from an appraisal theory point of view (e.g.,  Frijda,  1986 ;  Scherer,  1984b ; 
 Smith & Ellsworth,  1985 ), the two kinds of disgust involve diff erent appraisals and thus diff erent 
experiences, physiologies, action tendencies, and motivations to regulate expression. We hypothe-
size that moral disgust is characterized by a constellation of features—most notably the attribution 
of agency to another person—that overlaps with the elements of anger; physical disgust is closer to 
fear. Th e distinction may be appreciated by comparing physically disgusting situations (e.g.,  drink-
ing a glass of milk and discovering a cockroach at the bottom ;  seeing a man with his intestines exposed 
aft er an accident ) with morally disgusting situations (e.g.,  hearing a banker say to a Black man, “We 
don’t serve niggers in this bank” ;  seeing a doctor fondle an anesthetized female patient’s breasts before 
an operation when he thinks no one is around ;  Lee & Ellsworth,  2009 ).
 Of course, physical disgust and moral disgust are not mutually exclusive. Th ere are plenty of 
situations where they co-occur and indeed their intensities may correlate or mutually reinforce 
each other. But our goal in this chapter is to highlight their distinctive features, as opposed to the 
usual focus on their shared features or lack of distinction. In so doing, we highlight disgust–fear 
commonalities and disgust–anger commonalities in addition to the disgust–fear diff erences and 
disgust–anger diff erences emphasized in studies of facial expression ( Susskind et al.,  2008 ;  Whalen 
& Kleck,  2008 ).
 17.2  Appraisals, action tendencies, subjective experiences, 
and regulation of physical disgust and moral disgust in relation 
to fear and anger
 Morality is social. It describes “a code of conduct put forward by a society” ( Gert,  2008 ). Forces of 
nature, inanimate objects, and animals do not commit immoral acts. People do. Th e experience 
of moral disgust, therefore,  necessitates (a) the presence of an  agent (b) who behaves in a way that 
 violates societal norms or personal standards . Th ese conditions characterize the prototypical mor-
ally disgusting situations we mentioned earlier (e.g., seeing a doctor fondle an anesthetized female 
patient’s breasts), but are not necessary to evoke physical disgust (e.g., drinking milk with a roach 
in it). Contrasts between the two kinds of disgust for these situations have important implications.
 Th e presence of a specifi c agent in moral disgust provides a target (the wrongdoer) to whom 
perceivers can attribute responsibility and blame. Th e social and personal norms by which agentic 
behavior is judged are generally value-laden, providing perceivers with a sense of justifi cation and 
righteousness when they feel disgusted by immorality. In order to communicate their moral supe-
riority and their support of community norms, people may be likely to exaggerate their expression 
of moral disgust. In contrast, physical disgust is less likely to provoke value-laden judgments and 
censure, because there is no clearly blameworthy human agent. Th ere is no obvious reason for 
exaggerating the expression of physical disgust.
 If the social standards of a group are to be maintained, violations cannot be overlooked. It fol-
lows that moral disgust should prompt perceivers to change the agent or the situation by means of 
reprimands, punishment, or other corrective actions. Th us there is a motivation to approach the 
transgressors and deal with them. Th is motivation is likely to be coupled with a subjective feeling 
of  power that prepares the person to take action. Th e absence of perceived agency in physical dis-
gust makes these action tendencies unlikely. Instead, elicitors of physical disgust (e.g., vomit, feces, 
other bodily excretions) pose physical or biological threats that prompt avoidance. One cleans up 
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a loved one’s vomit reluctantly, because one must, not because one wants to. If a stranger vomits, 
one hurries away. “Th e behavior associated with [physical] disgust is typically a distancing from 
the disgusting situation or object. Distancing may be accomplished by an expulsion or removal 
of an off ending stimulus (as in spitting out or washing) or by a removal of the self from the situa-
tion (turning around, walking away) or by withdrawal of attention (closing or covering the eyes, 
engaging in some distraction or changing the topic of a conversation)” ( Rozin et al.,  1999 , p. 430). 
Th is avoidance orientation may be accompanied by the subjective experience of weakness and 
vulnerability.
 We argue that in the appraisals of agency and norm violation, the corresponding sense of jus-
tifi cation, the action tendencies of approach and punishment, and the subjective experience of 
dominance, moral disgust resembles anger ( Ellsworth & Scherer,  2003 ;  Kuppens et al.,  2003 ); in 
the absence of perceived agency and sense of justifi cation, the action tendencies of avoidance and 
withdrawal, and the subjective experience of weakness and dependence, physical disgust resem-
bles fear ( Ellsworth & Scherer,  2003 ;  Öhman,  2000 ). Th ese hypotheses, derived from an appraisal 
theory framework, go beyond simply proposing a disgust–anger association (which has been 
found in emotion-similarity sorting tasks in several languages;  Fontaine et al.,  2002 ;  Shaver et al., 
 1987 ;  Shaver et al.,  1992 ) or a disgust–fear association ( Nabi,  2002 ;  Olatunji et al.,  2005 ;  Simpson 
et al.,  2006 ). We explore the appraisals underlying these associations, as well as the corresponding 
action tendencies, subjective experiences, and motivations to regulate expression. Our conceptual 
hypothesis, in its most general formulation, is that (a) moral disgust diff ers from physical disgust; 
(b) moral disgust resembles anger; and (c) physical disgust resembles fear. We are not saying that
physical disgust and moral disgust have nothing in common, only that there are distinctive com-
ponents and processes that have not been emphasized in previous work.
 We explore our conceptual hypothesis using the GRID dataset. Th is dataset contains a single 
term for disgust and does not diff erentiate physical and moral disgust. In some ways it might have 
been better (and a more direct test of our hypothesis) if the GRID stimuli included  physical disgust 
and  moral disgust as separate emotions; however, many languages have only one term for disgust, 
and using two terms might have imposed a distinction on the respondents that was not natural to 
them. We felt that we could still use the GRID data to explore our hypotheses a little less directly. 
Our logic was as follows.
 We hypothesized that some of the attributes that people chose for  disgust would overlap with 
their responses to  anger , whereas other, diff erent attributes would overlap with their responses to 
 fear , suggesting two distinct kinds of disgust. Emotion features that characterize moral disgust, but 
not physical disgust, should be reported for  disgust but not for  fear . Th erefore, they should be rated 
higher for  disgust than for  fear . Emotion features that characterize physical disgust, but not moral 
disgust, should be reported for  disgust but not for  anger . Th erefore, they should be rated higher for 
 disgust than for  anger . In seeking to extract as much conceptual utility as possible from the GRID 
data, we believe that our current approach can provide suggestive, although far from defi nitive, 
evidence for two kinds of disgust. In the Discussion section, we briefl y describe supportive data 
from studies using diff erent methods.
 17.3  Method
 Participants
 One hundred and eighty-two college students at the University of Michigan completed the GRID 
questionnaire in English. Each participant rated four emotions randomly chosen from a pool of 24, 
resulting in slightly diff erent sample sizes for disgust, fear, and anger ( n = 35, 33, and 34).
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 Analytic strategy and predictions
 To test our conceptual hypothesis that (a) moral disgust diff ers from physical disgust insofar as 
(b) moral disgust resembles anger, and (c) physical disgust resembles fear, we conducted “per-
feature pairwise comparisons” among disgust, fear, and anger in the GRID dataset. We focused on 
the mean ratings for appraisals, action tendencies, and subjective experience (“emotion features”)
for which we had a priori predictions. Features on which both emotion terms in the pairwise com-
parison were rated below 4 (on a 9-point scale) were considered inapplicable to the emotions (e.g., 
“feeling good” is irrelevant to fear, anger, and disgust) and excluded from analysis.
 Since the common term in English ( disgust ) is used in both physical and moral senses, it would 
obviously have associations with both. Using  Smith’s ( 1997 ) rule-of-thumb for interpretation (see 
Part II of this volume), we ran four sets of per-feature pairwise comparisons to test the following 
predictions:
 1  Features on which disgust had significantly higher ratings than fear should be features we 
predicted to characterize moral disgust.
 2  Features on which disgust had ratings similar to fear should be features we predicted to char-
acterize physical disgust.
 3  Features on which disgust had significantly higher ratings than anger should be features we 
predicted to characterize physical disgust.
 4  Features on which disgust had ratings similar to anger should be features we predicted to 
characterize moral disgust. 
 17.4  Results 
 Comparison 1. Differences between disgust and fear: Moral disgust 
 People found several appraisals more characteristic of disgust than of fear. As can be seen in 
 Table  17.1 , disgusting situations were seen as signifi cantly more likely to involve violation of social 
norms, unjust treatment, and more generally, confl icts with one’s own standards and ideals. All of 
these refl ected an evaluative sociomoral judgment. Because morality and social evaluation pre-
suppose the existence and involvement of human agents, these mean diff erences also imply more 
human agency involved in disgust. Contrary to our expectations, there were no signifi cant diff er-
ences among fear, anger, and disgust on the direct measure of another person as agent, although 
the means were in the expected direction. However, the diff erences between appraisals of human 
and situational causes did show signifi cant results. Th e diff erence between “caused by someone 
else’s behavior” and “caused by chance” was greater for anger than for disgust, and greater for 
disgust than for fear. Th e diff erence between “caused by someone else’s behavior” and “caused by a 
supernatural  power ” were similar for anger and disgust, and greater than for fear. Th ese analyses 
suggest that human agency was seen as playing a greater role than situational forces in anger and 
disgust, but not in fear. 
 Th e consequences of disgusting situations were seen as more modifi able, possibly because the 
operation of human agency presents clearer opportunities for reprimands and repairs. When feel-
ing disgusted, people expected to have a stronger urge to hurt and command others. Such tenden-
cies to both  act against and  act upon mapped nicely onto their appraisals that  something/someone 
is wrong and their evaluative judgment that implied  I know what is right . Disgust was also consist-
ently higher than fear on such destructive motives as hurting others and destroying whatever is 
close.



















     Table 17.1  Empirical and further hypothesized differences between physical disgust and moral disgust in relation to fear and anger 
 Aspect  Physical disgust (resembling fear)  Moral disgust (resembling anger)  Means 
  Disgust  Fear  Anger 
 Results 
 Appraisal: agency, value judgment, 
or morality 
 Usually not involved  Involved (caused by someone else’s 
 behavior 1 †, more violation of social norms 2 , 
unjust treatment 3 , and incongruence with 

















 Appraisal: consequence  Less modifi able  More modifi able 1    1  5.23  4.39  5.69 
 Action tendency  Avoidance and dependence (stop current 
action 1 , prevent sensory  contact 2 , hide from 
others 3 ) 
 Approach and punishment (oppose 4 , be in 
 command of others 5 , destroy 6 , do damage, 





































 Regulation: exaggerated 
expression 
 Less likely  More likely 1    1  5.77  5  6.22 
 Exploratory hypotheses 
 Social complexity  Simpler  More complex (multiple perspectives, multiple 
 interpretations, multiple feelings) 
 Intensity (not direction) of 
 physiological response, subjective 
experience, action tendency, and 
expression 
 More intense (because more  concrete, 
 experientially direct, sensory, and 
 perceptual; more personally  immediate; 
 evolutionarily older) 
 Less intense (because more abstract, 
 conceptually  mediated, ideational, and 
 evaluative; less personally  immediate; 
 evolutionarily more recent) 
 Note: within each aspect, each superscript corresponds to an item in the GRID questionnaire. For example, superscript 1 within the  Appraisal: agency, value judgment, or morality aspect 
 corresponds to the item “violated laws or socially accepted norms.” † Mean values for this item were in the expected directions but not signifi cantly different from each other. 
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 Taken together, the appraisals and action tendencies that distinguished disgust from fear depict 
a kind of disgust that is grounded in sociomoral judgment and that motivates people to act in ways 
that resemble anger, a point also addressed in  Comparison  4 .
 Comparison 2. Similarities between disgust and fear: Physical disgust
 Disgust and fear were similar in motivating people to stop whatever they were doing and prevent 
sensory contact. Th e tendencies to  withhold and  move away were accompanied by a tone of help-
lessness, as people also wanted to pass on the initiative to others and simply comply with their 
wishes. Th ey felt weak, powerless, submissive, negative, and bad.
 Th e contrasts between the action tendencies in  Comparison  1 (act against, act upon, destroy) 
and  Comparison  2 (withdraw, repel, comply) are striking.  Comparison  1 showed that disgust dif-
fered from fear in that it prepared people to act in more dominant and approach-oriented ways, 
tendencies that were predicted to characterize moral disgust and anger.  Comparison  2 showed that 
both disgust and fear involved avoidance and dependence, tendencies that fi t well with accounts 
of physical disgust as a behavioral mechanism to avoid contamination or disease ( Curtis & Biran, 
 2001 ;  Oaten et al.,  2009 ;  Rozin & Fallon,  1987 ). Escaping from physical stimuli such as toxic objects 
or substances, contagious people, or an environment plagued with contaminants makes functional 
sense and gives physical disgust its behavioral similarities to fear.
 Comparison 3. Differences between disgust and anger: Physical disgust
 Disgust was seen as similar to fear ( Comparison  2 ) on features that at the same time distinguished 
it from anger ( Comparison  3 ). Compared to anger, disgust involved stronger urges to stop what-
ever one is doing, prevent sensory contact, and disappear or hide from others. Tellingly, in disgust 
people felt weaker, more submissive, and negative than in anger—the features that captured the 
similar subjective experiences of disgust and fear. Th ese divergences between disgust and anger 
matched the convergences between disgust and fear in  Comparison  2 , arguing for a kind of disgust 
that feels and functions less like anger but more like fear. By implication, they suggest that disgust 
is not merely an extreme form of anger.
 Comparison 4. Similarities between disgust and anger: Moral disgust
 Some of the features in which disgust resembled anger were the same ones that set it apart from 
fear ( Comparison  1 ). Anger-eliciting and disgust-eliciting situations both involved appraisals of 
violation of social norms, unjust treatment, and incompatibility with one’s own standards and ide-
als. People considered both kinds of situations as likely to be caused by somebody else’s behavior 
and to have consequences that were bad for themselves and for others but nonetheless modifi able. 
Th ese appraisals suggest the importance of human agency in the kind of disgust that has more to 
do with social behaviors than with physical causes, especially those implicating moral values. Th is 
kind of disgust prepares people to take the initiative and oppose, acting as though they were angry 
and ready to punish others.
 Exploratory analyses
 In addition to these results that supported our a priori predictions, a few other features emerged 
as more characteristic of disgust than of fear and anger. People’s expression of disgust was more 
likely to be exaggerated than their expression of fear. Th ere may be a communicative dynamic that 
is particularly relevant to moral disgust. Because moral disgust implies that “something is wrong” 
and “I know it is wrong,” an exaggerated expression ensures clear communication of this message 
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and may serve as evidence of one’s righteousness. Th e communicative function becomes more 
obvious when we imagine the converse, that is, expressing moral disgust less than we actually feel. 
If a brutal case of incest comes up in conversation and I say, “I think it’s understandable. I mean, 
yeah, raping his daughter is wrong, but human desires are hard to control,” people are likely to be 
repelled by my perverse moral sense. Exaggerating the expression of disgust confi rms one’s mem-
bership in the moral community.
 Disgust resembled anger in this exaggerated expression, but diff ered in that it prompted a 
somewhat more reparative action tendency. Th e hallmark behavioral response in anger is to ap-
proach and punish. Disgust shared these, but it also involved a stronger urge to undo what is hap-
pening, presumably to restore what was before, possibly making it a more constructive emotion 
than anger. Th e diff erence in action tendency between disgust and fear is also interesting. People 
were more likely to break contact with others and push things away when disgusted than when 
scared, suggesting a subtle distinction between the fear response that is more about removing 
oneself from the scene and the disgust response that is more about removing other people or the 
disgusting object.
 Summary
 As summarized in  Table  17.1 , the term  disgust elicited two separate, coherent clusters of apprais-
als, action tendencies, subjective experiences, and modes of expression regulation. Th e ones we 
associate with moral disgust involve more value-laden judgments, sociomoral concerns, and 
modifi able consequences. Th ese appraisals imply the presence of human agency. Although diff er-
ences among fear, anger, and disgust on the direct measure of agency did not reach signifi cance, 
human agency was seen as more important than situational forces for anger and disgust, but not 
for fear. Th ey also fi t with people’s stronger urges to approach and punish, accompanied by exag-
gerated expression and subjective experience of  power and dominance. Th e ones we associate 
with physical disgust, in contrast, are seen as involving less modifi able consequences, less value 
judgment, stronger urges to avoid and comply, diminished expression, and a sense of weakness 
and submissiveness.
 17.5  Discussion
 Exploratory analyses of the GRID dataset support the distinction suggested by earlier researchers 
between physical disgust and moral disgust, but also suggest that moral disgust is not simply an 
extension of physical disgust to a wider range of elicitors. Instead, moral disgust involves distinct 
appraisals such as incompatibility with personal or social standards ( Scherer,  1984b ) and changes 
the dominant action tendency from the withdrawal and avoidance characteristic of physical dis-
gust (e.g.,  Rozin et al.,  2000 ) to approach and attack, from fl ight to fi ght. Physical disgust shares 
appraisals with fear, moral disgust with anger. Th ese fi ndings are preliminary because the pres-
ence of one term ( disgust ) instead of two ( physical disgust and  moral disgust ) in the present dataset 
allows only an indirect test of the hypotheses and must be supplemented by other methodological 
approaches to testing the physical–moral distinction. Th ey also suggest several potential avenues 
for research.
 Agency
 Human agency is seen as more important than situational factors in the experience of moral dis-
gust but not physical disgust. How does agency come to be associated with disgust? Develop-
mentally, physical disgust precedes moral disgust.  Danovitch and Bloom ( 2009 ) found that both 
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kindergarteners and fourth graders respond with disgust to physically disgusting situations, but 
the kindergarteners are less likely to be disgusted by moral violations. Of course, even physical 
disgust develops over time: very young children have no qualms about putting food picked up 
from the fl oor or even insects and worms into their mouths until their horrifi ed parents teach 
them that it is disgusting ( Bloom,  2004 ,  Chapter  6 ). It may be that once children have internalized 
physical disgust, they react with disgust to other children who have not. When they see another 
child put a worm into his mouth, they are disgusted not just by the behavior but by the child, the 
agent of the disgusting behavior. Th ey blame the child and feel superior, and with the attribution of 
agency comes anger. At this point our reasoning is sheer speculation, but it is a promising avenue 
for future work.
 It is also important to remember that agency is not an all-or-none appraisal. When an action 
is seen as relatively uncontrollable or unintentional, the perceiver is likely to attribute less agency 
and thus less responsibility to the wrongdoer, feel less morally disgusted or angry, and call for less 
severe punishment. A person can be seen as lacking control for a variety of reasons, such as stupid-
ity, ignorance, or youth. If a mentally retarded person is pedophilic or voyeuristic, people may still 
fi nd the behavior unacceptable but feel less disgusted or angry at the off ender. If the purpose of 
punishment is to change behavior, then an actor whose problematic behavior is unmodifi able may 
be seen as less worthy of punishment (and elicit less moral disgust and anger). Th e law of homicide 
recognizes diff erent degrees of agency, diff erentiating premeditation, heat of passion, recklessness, 
negligence, and action under duress, and adjusts punishment accordingly. Children, and people 
suff ering from mental illness or defi ciency, are held less responsible than adults. Our results sug-
gest that the perception of agency is implicated in moral disgust and the motivation to punish. Of 
course it is rare that we see people as having absolutely no control over their behavior. Th e fact that 
human action is generally seen as controllable may explain why the co-occurrence of moral disgust 
and anger is the rule rather than the exception.
 Emotional complexity
 Another promising future direction is the emotional complexity aff orded by the presence of multi-
ple parties in morally disgusting situations—at least two (the wrongdoer and the perceiver), oft en 
more (a victim or victims). Perspective can powerfully shape emotional experience (e.g.,  Cohen 
et al.,  2007 ;  Kross et al.,  2005 ). We suggest that when the real eye or the mind’s eye attends to 
diff erent people in a complex social scene, diff erent appraisals become salient, and diff erent pro-
cesses ensue in the emotion components. Multiple perspectives aff ord multiple interpretations 
that generate multiple feelings. Focusing on the perpetrator elicits disgust; focusing on the victim 
elicits sympathy; focusing on the whole situation elicits frustration; focusing on the self as a per-
ceiver oft en suggests “I am diff erent from the perpetrator” and elicits a sense of superiority. People’s 
descriptions of their personal experiences of moral disgust reveal such shift ing perspectives and 
emotional changes ( Lee & Ellsworth,  2009 ). Earlier we cited  Marzillier and Davey’s ( 2004 ) fi nding 
that morally disgusting events evoke several negative emotions. When people turn the focus onto 
themselves, their emotion can even change  valence from negative to positive as they now feel 
righteous and superior.
 Physically disgusting situations are typically less socially complex and thus less emotionally 
complex ( Marzillier & Davey,  2004 ). Maggots, rotten meat, and feces, no matter how you look at 
them, are disgusting. Whether the focus is on the elicitor itself, on the whole situation, or on your-
self as a perceiver, the appraisals seem similar, as does the tendency to simply leave the scene and 
avoid contact with it. Other data suggest that people’s descriptions of their feelings in physically 
disgusting experiences are relatively simple ( Lee & Ellsworth,  2009 ).
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 Beyond English—potential of cross-linguistic, cross-cultural analysis
 Th is chapter provides an indirect, preliminary exploration of features common to physical disgust 
and fear on the one hand and to moral disgust and anger on the other. Th ese associations have 
proven to be coherent and replicable in our subsequent research using multiple methods, correla-
tional and experimental, to provide evidence that physically disgusting situations and experiences 
are distinct from morally disgusting ones and have diff erent psychological consequences ( Lee & 
Ellsworth,  2009 ). For example, analyses of people’s self-reported emotional reactions to a variety 
of situations show that people react with strong fear to the most physically disgusting situations 
but with strong anger to the most morally disgusting situations. In physically disgusting situations, 
people who feel more disgusted also feel more fear, even controlling for anger. In morally disgust-
ing situations, people who feel more disgusted are also angrier, even controlling for fear.
 Altogether these convergent fi ndings deepen our understanding of the two kinds of disgust and 
their very diff erent appraisals, action tendencies, subjective experiences, and expression regula-
tion. At the same time, it is noteworthy that all of the observed eff ects are based on a language 
where the term  disgust applies to both physical and moral stimuli. Although the same is true in 
many languages, we are cautious about hasty generalization across languages. Th e GRID dataset 
may provide examples of languages where the term  disgust is applicable only at the physical level or 
only at the moral level (though this seems less likely), or languages that have two or more distinct 
terms for disgust. Inquiries to GRID investigators reveal that in some languages the vocabulary for 
disgust is much more fi nely diff erentiated than it is in English. In the future, we plan to follow up 
our investigation with a more detailed examination and comparison of the connotations of disgust 
in languages that have one, two, or several diff erent terms for this cluster of emotional experiences.
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